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“ESTABLISHMENT”: A CORE CONCEPT IN
CHINESE INBOUND INCOME TAXATION
Wei Cui*
Analogous with the concept of a U.S. “trade or
business” in U.S. federal income tax law, the concept of
“establishment” under Chinese tax law determines the
boundary between net-income and gross-income taxation
of inbound investments. As central as the concept is, it has
received surprisingly little interpretation.
This Article traces the cause of this underinterpretation to China’s traditional regulatory
environment for foreign investment that was biased against
portfolio investments and non-corporate business forms,
and describes recent regulatory and commercial
developments that may rekindle interest in elaborating the
meaning of “establishment.”
It then reviews the
interpretations that have been given to the concept under
existing law, as well as several areas of commercial
practice where additional guidance is urgently needed.
Finally, the Article examines what policy considerations
should guide the further development of the concept.
This policy analysis considers the overall tax policy
stance toward foreign portfolio investment that may
reasonably be attributed to China. The country’s large
surpluses in current and capital accounts and currency
reserves make it doubtful that a dramatically more
favorable model for taxing foreign investment is
appropriate in the near term. 'onetheless, because tax
policy plays a subsidiary role to other regulatory policy in
the treatment of foreign investments, cogent arguments can
be advanced for adopting an interpretation of
“establishment” that allows foreign portfolio investment
already identified as beneficial for China to proceed.

* Associate Professor, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing. I am
grateful to Huang Zhen, Tong Yingying and Li Kaigeng for research assistance, and to Mr.
Jeffery Kadet and Professor Adam Chodorow for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper. Author email: wei.cui@aya.yale.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
A basic similarity between the Chinese approach to international
income taxation and that of many other countries is the two-tiered system
China uses to tax inbound foreign investments: some items of income
earned by foreigners are taxed on a gross-income basis, primarily by way of
withholding, while others are taxed on a net-income basis, through the
filing of annual tax returns that account for both income and expenses. In
the U.S., as a comparative example, whether an item of income is subject to
one or the other mode of taxation turns upon whether the foreign recipient
of income is engaged in a “trade or business” in the U.S. and whether the
income is “effectively connected” with such U.S. trade or business.1 In
China, a similar determination for a foreign non-individual taxpayer
1. I.R.C. §§ 871, 881, 882 (2009).
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depends on whether the foreign entity’s income is effectively connected
with an “establishment or site” (“jigouchangsuo,” or “establishment” for
short) in China.2
The existence of this point of resemblance between Chinese and
American inbound income taxation is in itself unsurprising. There is, after
all, the income tax treaty concept of “permanent establishment,” which
determines whether the business profits of an enterprise are taxable on a
net-income basis in the country where the income arises.3 This suggests
that most countries adopt some combination of taxation on the basis of net
and gross income for inbound investments. However, U.S. tax lawyers
generally are careful in distinguishing between domestic and treaty law
concepts. In the U.S., for example, the “U.S. trade or business”4 concept
carries most of the weight in determining whether foreigners might be
taxable on a net-income basis, whereas the “permanent establishment”
concept performs, for the most part, a secondary function in determining
how a nonresident would be taxed in the U.S.5 Similarly, it is prudent to
expect that the “permanent establishment” concept would not capture how
other countries draw the line between net- and gross-income basis taxation,
and this determination for a foreign investor in China will rest on the
interpretation of the domestic Chinese concept of “establishment.” How
China has drawn this line in the past, and how it might redraw it in the
future, is the subject of this Article.6
The urgent need to clarify the legal definition and application of
“establishment” in China stems from three sets of recent legal, regulatory
and commercial developments. The first is a liberalization of foreign
investment regulations to permit more foreign business activities to be
conducted in non-corporate forms, e.g., contractual joint ventures and
partnerships.7 Because the inflexibilities of China’s law for corporations
2. Enterprise Income Tax Law (10th Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective
Jan. 1, 2008), arts. 3(2), 3(3), translated in WORLDLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter EIT Law].
3. See Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, arts. 5, 7 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/49/35363840.pdf [hereinafter OECD Model Convention]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
4. I.R.C. § 864(b) (2009).
5. See I.R.C. § 894(a) (2009).
6. Whether any item of income received by a foreign entity may be taxed on a netincome basis also depends on whether the income is “effectively connected” with an
“establishment.” Thus, strictly speaking, having an “establishment” in China is only a
necessary and not a sufficient condition for net-income basis taxation to apply. However,
the examination of the law and practice of attribution of income to an “establishment” is
beyond the scope of this Article.
7. See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.
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have long constituted a burden for foreign investors, this regulatory
relaxation is likely to be met with enthusiasm among investors interested in
China.8 Moreover, rapid developments in venture capital (VC) and private
equity (PE), where the use of noncorporate forms prevails even in countries
with flexible corporate laws, have also generated interest on the part of
foreign investors in such forms in China.9 Because in China, as elsewhere,
whether a foreign person is taxed on a net-income or gross-income basis
generally becomes an issue only when the person has an unincorporated
business presence,10 exploration of new business forms has raised new
questions about the line between these two bases of taxation.
Second, foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in China, as opposed to
foreign direct investment (FDI), is now viewed more favorably than before,
and it is starting to play a greater role in China’s capital markets.11 For
active business operations in a foreign country (typically associated with
FDI), net-income taxation, borne by either a subsidiary or a branch, is
generally a given. It is typically passive investment activities that are
sensitive to whether net-income or gross-income taxation applies. For
example, under China’s new Enterprise Income Tax Law (“EIT Law”) and
its implementing regulations, the corporate income tax rate is 25%, whereas
the withholding tax rate on dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains, etc.,
is 10%.12 For most portfolio investors, despite the lack of deductions,
investment income would be subject to a lower Chinese tax rate (further
reducible under income tax treaties) if it were not treated as received by a
Chinese establishment. As experience in the U.S. has shown,13 when FPI
becomes an important part of a country’s domestic capital markets,
delineating the boundary between net-income and gross-income taxation

8. Nancy Marsh et al., Partnerships in China: The 'ew Frontier, 14(4) IBFD ASIAN
PAC. TAX BULL. 296, 296 (2008) (discussing the attraction of the partnership form as a way
of circumventing the corporate form’s limitations on capital structure).
9. See, e.g., Alan Tsoi & Pauline Zhang, Venture Capital and Private Equity Funds in
China, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 1211 (2009).
10. This is because business presence in the form of a corporate subsidiary is generally
taxed under the regular income tax on a net-income basis. See infra Section I.A.1.
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. EIT Law, supra note 2, art. 4(1) (setting the corporate rate at 25%), art. 4(2)
(setting the maximum withholding tax rate at 20%), art. 37 (providing for withholding on
Chinese-source income); Enterprise Income Tax Law Implementation Regulations
(promulgated by the State Council, Decree No. 512, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art.
91(1), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter EIT Law IR]
(reducing the withholding tax rate to 10%).
13. See generally Stanford G. Ross, United States Taxation of Aliens and Foreign
Corporations: The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 and Related Developments, 22 TAX
L. REV 277 (1967); David R. Sicular & Emma Q. Sobol, Selected Current Effectively
Connected Income Issues for Investment Funds, 56 TAX LAW 719 (2003).
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also becomes crucial.
Third, the new EIT Law, effective since 2008, has dramatically
limited the scope of tax holidays and concessions previously available to
foreign investments.14 In the absence of these concessions and tax holidays,
Chinese tax planning for foreign investors will return to more traditional
methods involving transaction structure, transfer pricing, and the like.
These require more attention to technical applications of increasingly
complex rules, in contrast to the previous singular focus of most FDI
investors on obtaining tax holidays and other preferences. One of the many
novel aspects of the EIT Law is that it has both rationalized and increased
the complexity of the two-tiered structure of inbound taxation. At the
center of this structure is the notion of “establishment or site.” Yet, as this
Article explains, the notion of “establishment” has not been adequately
interpreted under Chinese tax law and remains poorly understood by both
taxpayers and tax authorities. In light of growing taxpayer sophistication,
this lack of clarity will become increasingly noticeable.
This Article offers the first scholarly analysis of the essential
Chinese tax concept of “establishment” in terms not only of its past and
current interpretation but also of its likely treatment in the near future. In
examining the latter, I will be particularly concerned with the design of
appropriate tax rules for foreign portfolio investment. This focus reflects
my belief that, more than other underlying economic causes for
unincorporated business presences of foreigners, FPI in China’s capital
markets will drive the development of the law relating to establishments.15
The Article will be organized as follows. In Section I, I describe
the relatively unique legal, regulatory and commercial contexts in which
“establishment” applies. These contextual configurations are important for
tax practitioners and policymakers to understand because they significantly
shape how tax issues arise and how the market and governmental
authorities respond. In particular, I argue that the intertwining of
organizational and regulatory law in China traditionally created a serious
bias against unincorporated forms of foreign investment. This may be the
single most important factor that explains the underdevelopment of the

14. Tax holidays had been granted on the basis of the location and nature of the
operation of the FIEs. They often covered at least firms’ initial five profitable years, and
sometimes lasted even longer. See generally Jinyan Li, Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax
Reform in China: Motivations and Major Changes, 61 BULLETIN FOR INT’L TAXATION 519
(2007).
15. Other underlying causes include natural resource explorations, short-term visits of
professionals providing technological know-how, and so on. See ARVID A. SKAAR,
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT: EROSION OF A TAX TREATY PRINCIPLE (Kluwer Law and
Taxation 1991), at 13–17.
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concept of “establishment” (compared to the elaboration of the concept’s
equivalent in other jurisdictions) in the past. In addition, significant
barriers to foreign portfolio investment also limit the scope of application of
“establishment.” Although restrictions against unincorporated business
forms and FPI have been significantly relaxed recently, the incremental
fashion in which this is taking place also explains the slowness with which
tax authorities have responded.
Section II turns to government-issued interpretations of the scope
of “establishment” under Chinese statutes and regulations, as well as the
areas of foreign investment in which the ambiguities associated with the
concept have recently become most notable. While the government’s
interpretations of “establishment” remain incomplete, important examples
can be found showing at least an awareness of the special problems posed
by noncorporate business forms and portfolio investments. However, this
awareness has yet to develop into a sustained recognition of an important
policy issue. In the meantime, striking inconsistencies exist in the implicit
approach the government has taken toward the interpretation of
“establishment.”
In Section III, I try to advance this area of policy by examining
some of the choices facing the further development of the notion of
“establishment.” The first choice can be formulated as the following
question: assuming that foreign portfolio investors favor the exclusion of
passive investments from the definition of “establishment,” would a
comprehensive interpretation of “establishment” in this manner be
appropriate in the near future? Because China is likely to continue to
control capital accounts,16 particularly in the face of increasing evidence of
inflow associated with the expectation of continued appreciation of the
renminbi (the Chinese currency) and global financial instability generally,
the answer appears to be “no,” at least for the short term. Assuming this
answer to be correct, one may nonetheless raise the question: how can
reasonable tax treatments be designed for forms of FPI, e.g., private equity
investments, that are already identified as beneficial for China? Using the
currently-debated issue of the partnership-to-partner attributions of business
nexus as an illustration, I argue that more specific policy considerations
must be introduced to make advances in this area. Such considerations
include whether a tax rule is aimed at affecting a binary decision by
investors of investing or not investing, instead of at a marginal decision of
how much more to invest, as well as whether the rule introduces dissimilar
treatment of foreign and domestic investors that could easily lead to
manipulation.

16. See infra notes 171–184 and accompanying text.
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While I believe that many of the empirical hypotheses and legal
interpretations advanced in this Article are novel in some respects, the
arguments in Section III are explorations in uncharted waters to an even
greater extent than others. Especially because of different views about the
nature of capital inflows and their impact on the Chinese economy,17 it has
become difficult in the past few years to find coherent articulations of
China’s overall economic policy toward inbound portfolio investment.
Even rarer are discussions of what tax policies may be appropriate for the
coming years. I believe this is largely attributable to the fact that economic
and tax policies toward foreign investment fall within the jurisdiction of an
at once insular and fragmented bureaucratic state, where there are few
channels for public input and little inter-agency coordination. The
bureaucrats in charge generally lack the incentives to confront larger policy
issues and to process and integrate the information needed to resolve them.
However, the politics of regulation-making in China is beyond the scope of
this Article.18 I nevertheless offer a tentative analysis of the considerations
relevant to current tax policy toward inbound portfolio investment in the
hope that the analysis (however inchoate) may shed light on where the
government’s and taxpayers’ interests lie, so that technical discussions of
treatments of particular transactions may take on a greater sense of purpose.
I. LEGAL, REGULATORY AND COMMERCIAL CONTEXT FOR THE CONCEPT
OF “ESTABLISHMENT”
Non-tax legal and regulatory factors can sometimes shape tax law
concepts in powerful ways. In China, as elsewhere, a locally formed
corporation is treated as a domestic taxpayer even if owned wholly by
foreign persons.19 Thus, whether a foreign person is taxed on a net-income
basis is an issue only when the person has an unincorporated business
presence in China, and the concept of “establishment” applies only where
unincorporated business operations are permitted by non-tax law. A crucial
piece of background for understanding China’s inbound tax rules is
therefore that the country’s FDI regulatory regime has traditionally
displayed a substantial bias against unincorporated business forms.20 This
Section explores the manifestations and causes of this bias. It also
examines a policy preference against foreign portfolio investment—another

17. See infra notes 173–179 and accompanying text.
18. See generally VICTOR SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE
Press 2008).
19. See EIT Law, supra note 2, art. 2.
20. See infra Section I.A.
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factor that in the past has impeded the development of tax rules concerning
“establishment.”
Besides providing the background to China’s inbound tax rules, the
bias in the choice of form in China’s FDI regulation raises an interesting
question for tax scholars. In the design of international tax policy, a
fundamental question is whether tax law should give effect to the legal
distinctness of corporate subsidiaries.21 In the context of such discussion, it
seems useful to know whether multinational corporations (MNCs), when
they choose to invest in other jurisdictions, generally prefer to use corporate
subsidiaries as opposed to branches. It is sometimes observed that, in fact,
MNCs predominantly use the subsidiary form.22 As we will see, while this
observation also holds true in the context of foreign investment in China, it
does not reveal anything about MNC preferences since in China, the branch
form is generally not allowed.23 Indeed, given the rigid capital structure
requirements for the corporate form, many MNCs investing in China,
unless they have very substantial operations there, would likely have a
preference for non-corporate forms. More generally, there may be other
countries like China, where a relatively rigid statutory limitation on
corporate form would have created a preference for the branch form, but the
branch or other non-corporate form was not available to achieve MNCs’
economic goals. This suggests that the empirical question of what MNCs
prefer is quite complicated, as it would need to take into account different
countries’ regulatory hurdles for different business forms.
A.

Historical Bias Against Unincorporated Forms

While the limited availability of noncorporate business
organizational forms in China has not gone unnoticed,24 there is no official
or well-known account of why this is the case. A plausible hypothesis
would explain the phenomenon as follows. The early development of the
FDI regime focused on corporate forms.25 Because foreign invested
21. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt
Formulary Apportionment for Corporate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project (Univ. of
Mich. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 85, 2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995202
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
22. See Daniel Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better?, 54 TAX L. REV. 353,
360 (2001).
23. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
24. See Xinmiao Tang, Inquiry into the Organizational Forms Available to Foreign
Invested Enterprises, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DAILY (China), February 22, 2002, at 8 (in
Mandarin).
25. Since the late 1970s, China has erected a legal framework for FDI by adopting a
series of laws and regulations, among which three statutes have set force the three major
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enterprises (FIEs) are heavily regulated in China, with regulatory power
over them assigned to powerful government agencies early on, the
corporate forms of FIEs became associated with vested interests of the
regulatory agencies.26 These vested interests ensured that non-corporate
forms were neglected in the legislative process and discriminated against in
practice, since such forms would not enhance, and could even detract from,
the authority of the agencies.
The juncture at which corporate law and regulatory interest become
intertwined can be identified more precisely. A basic distinction between
corporate and non-corporate business forms in China is the emphasis on a
relatively stable capital structure for the corporate form.27 Following a
continental European model,28 China’s corporations are subject to
registered capital requirements where both increases and decreases in
equity capital require cumbersome procedures purported to facilitate
monitoring by creditors.29 These aspects of the corporate law, aimed at
protecting creditors against shareholders, coincided with many early FDI
regulatory concerns, such as that FIEs engaged only in business activities
for which they were approved, that foreign investors actually contributed
the capital and technologies that they promised, and that foreign investors

permitted forms of foreign invested entities. The earliest of these statutory forms—the
Chinese-foreign equity joint venture—was required to be corporate in nature. Although the
two later forms (the Chinese-foreign cooperative joint venture and the wholly-owned foreign
enterprise) theoretically allowed non-corporate variations, their legislation was
contemporaneous with efforts to draft the Company Law, and well preceded the Partnership
Enterprise Law and other business organizational law. See, inter alia, the Law on ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
July 1, 1979, effective as amended Mar. 15, 2001), translated in ASIANLII (last visited Feb.
14, 2010) [hereinafter EJV Law]; the Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., April 13, 1988, effective as amended Oct. 31,
2000), translated in ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter CJV Law]; the Law
on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., April 12,
1986,
effective
as
amended
Oct.
31,
2000),
available
at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200411/20041100311068.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (as revised Oct. 31, 2000) (in translation); the Company Law
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective as
amended Oct. 27, 2005), translated in ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter
Company Law].
26. The most important of these agencies include the Ministry of Commerce and the
State Development and Reform Commission (and their predecessors), as well as the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL, 368–409 (2d ed. 2009).
27
See generally Yan Liu, Reflections on the Registered Capital System, 51.31 PEKING U.
LAW REV. (zhongwai faxue) 34 (1997); Xudong Zhao, From Reliance on Capital to Reliance
on Assets, 25.5 CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW (faxueyanjiu) 109 (2003).
28. See generally Zhao, supra note 27.
29. Id.
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did not financially harm Chinese joint venture partners.30 Therefore, FIE
regulations tended to accentuate these aspects of the corporate model: for
example, changes in capital structure of an FIE must not only be
accountable to creditors, but also be approved by the government itself.31
Even as the regulatory concerns gradually lost their relevance when China’s
economy became more open after the 1990s, government agencies seemed
reluctant to surrender control. Enforcing the rigidities of corporate law
allowed them to continue to wield power over FIEs; it is therefore not
surprising that these agencies are at best ambivalent about the development
of new, more flexible business forms.
This explanation of the regulatory entrenchment of the corporate
form is consistent with the history of the development of the few noncorporate business forms available to foreign investors, including the
representative office, the corporate branch, and the cooperative joint
venture.
The most traditional type of unincorporated presence in China is
the representative office (RO).32 Initially, ROs were the only footholds
foreign businesses could establish in China’s closed economy.33 They were
meant to serve no more than liaison functions and were subject to light
regulatory requirements. In a very few sectors, ROs were subsequently
permitted to grow and perform more robust functions. For example,
foreign law firms were explicitly authorized to provide certain legal
services through ROs, and that is how most foreign law firms in China
operate now.34 But outside these sectors, ROs are prohibited from engaging
30. See, e.g., EJV Law, supra note 25, at art. 5 (venture partner must warrant quality of
equipment and technology); Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-foreign
Equity Joint Ventures, art. 4 (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 20, 1983, last
amended
July
22,
2001),
available
at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/RegulationsonForei
gnInvestment/P020060620322890786346.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (as revised July
22, 2001) (in translation) (stating that the government should review a joint venture contract
to ensure that it is not “patently unfair to one party”).
31. See Paul, Hastings Shanghai Office, Using a Chinese Entity for an All-foreign Joint
Venture in China—Does It Make Sense?, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, May 2005, at 28; see also
generally CHOW, supra note 26, Chapter 10.
32. See Interim Provisions on the Administration of Resident Representative Offices of
Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 30, 1980), translated in
ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
33. See OWEN D. NEE, JR., Business Operations in the People’s Republic of China,
B.N.A. TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 957-3d, A-25 to A-26 (2008).
34. In effect, therefore, law firm ROs are like branches, even though they are not
labeled as such. Regulation on Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law
Firms (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 22, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-08/24/content_25816.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010)
(in translation).
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in direct profit-making activities (including investing) and from performing
other than ancillary functions.35 Instead, profit-making activities must be
pursued through the heavily regulated FIE forms.36 In reality, the boundary
between “support functions” and “direct” profit-making activities is vague;
it is difficult for businesses to avoid and for the government to police. The
ROs of many foreign businesses venture into grey areas far from the
strictest interpretation of the officially sanctioned business scope for ROs.37
A second type of unincorporated presence is the corporate branch.
Although China’s Company Law has allowed foreign companies to
establish branches since 1993, it required the State Council to issue
regulations for the approval of such branches.38 Relevant regulations have
been adopted for only a few sectors (including banking). Thus, the only
foreign companies that have opened branches in China fall within those few
sectors.39 Note that in the few sectors in which either ROs are permitted to

35. A 1995 regulation stated that, for ROs under its jurisdiction, none can engage in
“direct” profit-making activities. Instead, they may only pursue “liaison, marketing support,
information gathering and technology exchanges.” In other words, an RO generally is not
allowed to pursue businesses of its own; it can only provide support to the business activities
of the foreign company of which the RO is legally a part. Implementing Rules for the
Examination, Approval and Administration of Resident Representative Offices of Foreign
Enterprises (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation, Feb. 13,
1995), available at http://www.pathtochina.com/chinabiz/2007/12/detailed-rules-of-theimplementation-of-the-examination-approval-and-administration-of-the-residentrepresentative-offices-of-foreign-enterprises-in-china/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (in
translation).
36. In a recent sign of liberalization of foreign investment regulation, the State Council
has circulated a draft of the revised Administrative Measures for the Registration of
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises (on file with the author), which states that a
representative office may engage in profit-making activities to the extent provided by
treaties or agreements that China has entered into with other countries.
37. Indirect evidence for this occurrence is a large number of circulars issued by the
Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and local tax agencies on the
taxation of different types of income of ROs. See e.g., Cai shui [1985] 110 [Interim
Provisions Concerning Imposition of Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax and
Enterprise Income Tax on Resident Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, May 15 1985); Cai shui [1985] 122 [Interpretation
of Some Policy Matters Regarding the Interim Provisions for the Collection of Consolidated
Industrial and Commercial Tax and Enterprises Income Tax on Resident Representative
Offices] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, May 15 1985); Cai shui wai [1985] 197
[Additional Regulations on the Question Concerning Imposition of Consolidated Industrial
and Commercial Tax and Enterprise Income Tax on Resident Representative Offices of
Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and State Admin. of Taxation,
Sept. 25, 1985).
38. Company Law, supra note 25, art. 11.
39. See State Council Decree [2006] 478 [Regulations on the Administration of
Foreign-Invested Banks] (promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 8, 2006) (permitting bank
branches); State Council Decree [2001] 336 [Regulation on the Administration of Insurance
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pursue profit-making activities directly or foreign companies are allowed to
set up branches, specialized agencies—including the Ministry of Justice
(which regulates the legal profession) and bank and insurance regulators—
are involved, in addition to the agencies generally in charge of foreign
direct investment. This may suggest that unincorporated business pursuits
were made possible in these sectors only because other bureaucratic voices
superseded the voice of the pro-corporate-form, traditional FDI regulators.
Yet another story illustrating the same inhospitality toward noncorporate forms relates to the history of the cooperative joint venture (CJV),
one of the three traditional forms of FIEs.40 Before the CJV form was
codified in 1988,41 Chinese and foreign venture partners experimented with
the form and, in some cases, indicated a preference for a CJV to take the
“non-legal person” format—in other words, to be merely contractual in
nature and not limited in liability as a matter of organizational law.42 This
preference, as well as the use of similar organizational forms in other
countries, was recognized by the government when the CJV Law was
drafted.43 However, soon after the FIE regulatory regime established its
authority over the CJV form, the use of the non-legal person CJV declined,
reportedly because “government authorities [would] generally no longer
approve such cooperative enterprises.”44 This was so much the case that
when the government revived the non-legal person CJV form for
establishing domestic venture capital funds in 2003 (discussed immediately
below), even the most experienced legal and tax practitioners in China
confessed to unfamiliarity with it.

Companies with Foreign Investment] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 5, 2001)
(permitting insurance company branches); State Council Decree [1993] 131 [Regulation on
Sino-Foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Continental Petroleum Resources]
(promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 7, 1993, as amended by State Council Decree 317,
Sept. 18, 2007) (permitting oil and gas company branches).
40. See CJV Law, supra note 25.
41. The Law on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (promulgated by the
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 13, 1988, revised Oct. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.hecpb.gov.cn/english/news/display.php?id=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (in
translation).
42. See Tuobin Deng, Minister of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation, (7th Nat’l
People’s Cong. Mar. 31, 1988) (discussing the draft of the CJV Law submitted to the Nat’l
People’s Cong.).
43. Id.
44. NEE, supra note 33, at A-23 to A-24. Although the CJV (even in its legal person
form) is widely perceived to be more flexible than the equity joint venture (EJV), the use of
CJVs in general lagged behind the use of EJVs, likely due to the regulatory preference over
the latter.
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Recent Advances in Partnership Forms

In contrast to the historical bias against unincorporated forms of
foreign investment, a remarkable surge of interest in such forms has taken
place in the last few years. This began with a multi-agency effort to
promote venture capital investing in China in the early 2000s.45 Foreign
VC operators were perceived to be crucial providers of expertise in the
nascent industry, and after a few years of consultation, the government
understood that foreign fund sponsors would only accept non-corporate
means of fund formation.46 Because China’s Partnership Enterprise Law
did not permit foreign or non-individual investors at that time, the
government turned to the cooperative joint venture for organizing “foreigninvested venture capital investment enterprises,” permitting the use of nonlegal person CJV for this purpose.47
More recently, in 2006, China revised its Partnership Enterprise
48
Law. The revised Partnership Enterprise Law for the first time permits
foreign investors to become partners in Chinese partnerships and provides a
statutory framework for limited partnerships.49 No particular government
agency can be considered the backer or sponsor of the Partnership
Enterprise Law’s revision.50 Instead, it was moved along by China’s
legislative elite (including legal academics, but with little participation from
legal service providers) generally responsible for planning the development
of China’s statutory framework.51 For this reason, although foreign
investment in Chinese partnerships is now a statutory possibility, its
actualization, like the actualization of the possibility of foreign corporate
branches in China, still faces some uncertainty.
In particular, according to the Partnership Enterprise Law, foreign45. See Jeff Wood & Richard Xu, China’s Revised Venture Capital Rules: Limited
Partnerships with Chinese Characteristics?, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Mar. 2003, at 18.
46. Id.
47. See Provisions Concerning the Administration of Foreign-Funded Venture
Investment Enterprises (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ.
Cooperation,
Jan.
30,
2003,
effective
Mar.
1,
2003)
available
at
http://english.sohu.com/2004/07/04/78/article220847846.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
48. The Partnership Enterprise Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb.
23,
1997,
as
amended
Aug.
27,
2006)
available
at
http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/partnership.doc (last visited Feb. 14. 2010) [hereinafter
Partnership Enterprise Law].
49. See Marsh et al., supra note 8; Peng Tao, Is It a Good Time to Form a Chinese
Partnership Enterprise?, CHINA TAX INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 2007 at 22.
50. Interview with Shuguang Li, Professor, China University of Political Science and
Law, in Beijing, China (Aug. 10, 2006). Professor Li participated in the drafting of the
Partnership Law.
51. Id.
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invested partnerships (FIPs) can be established only pursuant to further
regulations issued by the State Council.52 In designing such regulations,
which have not yet been issued, the State Council faces a dilemma. On one
hand, the regulation of FIPs needs to generally conform to regulations
governing other FIEs: if the former is significantly more relaxed than the
latter, then many foreign businesses will abandon the traditional rigid FIE
forms in favor of the more flexible partnership form.53 This could lead to
an opening in the FIE control regime with unpredictable consequences.
“On the other hand, keeping FIPs in parity with traditional FIEs would
largely deprive FIPs of the attractions of the partnership form, and
essentially defeat the purpose” of enacting the legislation.54
However, in discussions preceding the adoption of the revised
Partnership Enterprise Law, it was clearly understood that the partnership
form was necessary for venture capital development.55 Indeed, some of the
strongest interest in the newly available partnership form has come from
Chinese and foreign financial operators looking to establish onshore, RMBdenominated funds.56 It is possible that regulations for establishing FIPs
will be issued specifically for the VC and PE industries, much as
regulations for establishing branches of foreign corporations were issued
for select financial industries.57 What is more difficult to predict is whether
the recent and imminent advances in the use of non-corporate forms (nonlegal person CJVs and partnerships) in the context of investment businesses
will transform the general bias against unincorporated forms of FDI.
Because of that bias, foreign companies (outside the few sectors where
business operations through the RO and branch forms are permitted) have
in the past been found to have establishments in China for tax purposes
mostly in connection with the exploration and extraction of natural

52. Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 48, art. 108.
53. For further discussion of this dilemma and draft FIP regulations circulated in 2007,
see Wei Cui, China: Will Partnership Law Be Worth It?, XXVII INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept.
2008, at 30–32.
54. Id.
55. See Ruihua Sun, China’s Venture Capital at a Turning Point, 130 NEW ECON.
WKLY,
April
3,
2007
(in
Mandarin),
available
at
http://www.daokan.com/ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=2310&ArticlePage=1 (last visited Feb.
14, 2010).
56. See Rick Carew, China Cheers Private-Equity Home Teams, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
2007, at C1; Rick Carew, Chinese Private-Equity Fund’s 'ew Role, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
2007, at C3; Rick Carew, 'ew Private-Equity Fund Targets Deals in China, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 2008, at C3; China Onshore Private Equity Funds (Clifford Chance Client Briefing),
Nov. 2007 (on file with author).
57. See Rick Carew, Buyout Firms Race to Build Yuan Funds to Tap China, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 21, 2009, at C2 (reporting that draft rules governing yuan private-equity funds are in
the hands of China’s cabinet).
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resources, construction and installation projects, and other activities of a
relatively temporary nature.58 The introduction of investment or operating
partnerships (or partnership-like entities) would create significant new
challenges for tax rules, as further discussed in Sections II.C and III.B,
infra.
C.

Increased Foreign Portfolio Investment

Besides giving impetus to the development of non-corporate
business forms, foreign investments in Chinese VC and PE funds also
represent another trend with important implications for inbound taxation.
Such funds often acquire significant stakes in target companies, and, on
occasion, provide active financial and management services to the portfolio
companies. For this reason, whether investment by a fund should be treated
as passive investment may be subject to debate. On the other hand, the
investments made in these funds by limited partners are more clearly
characterized as passive investments, and therefore can be regarded as part
of a broader pattern of increased foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in
China.
Traditionally, official Chinese policy discounted the need for FPI.
Because of the high domestic savings rate and other factors, China was not
thought to need financial capital per se.59 Instead, the attraction of foreign
investment was the introduction of technologies and know-how (and until
recently, the development of China’s export economy), and this could
happen only through FDI.60 Thus China’s foreign investment regime has
been heavily biased toward equity as opposed to debt investments.61 Even
for equity investments, foreigners are encouraged to invest only in certain
sectors where China’s technological needs are obvious, and are restricted or
prohibited from investing in disfavored sectors.62
58. For a discussion of the tax rules in this area, see Joint Oil and Gas Exploitation
Between Foreign and Chinese Companies (Deloitte World Tax Advisor), Mar. 20, 2009,
available at http://deloitte.12hna.com/newsletters/2009/WTA/a090320_1.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010).
59. See Eswar Prasad & Shang-Jin Wei, The Chinese Approach to Capital Inflows:
Patterns and Possible Explanations, in CAPITAL CONTROLS AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES: POLICIES, PRACTICES AND CONSEQUENCES 421 (Sebastian Edwards
ed., 2007).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 433; see also Neal Stender et al., Foreign Currency Debt and Conversion
Controls Tightened for Strong RMB Era, 18 CHINA LAW & PRACTICE 73, 73 (July/Aug.
2004) (summarizing the basic workings of cross-border borrowing by FIEs in China).
62. See generally Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 429; see also, generally, YASHENG
HUANG, SELLING CHINA–FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA
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This policy has had two consequences. One is that is that FPI has
lagged behind FDI in China in terms of volume. According to IMF data, by
2006, the stock of FPI into China was worth only a little over $200 billion,
much less than the official FDI stock of $742 billion.63 In comparison, the
U.S. attracted slightly more equity FPI than FDI in 2007; the volume of
each exceeded $2 trillion.64 The other consequence is that while the total
amount of China-bound FPI is still significant, most such investments have
taken place offshore, as Chinese companies listed their stock and debt
securities in foreign exchanges in Hong Kong, the U.S., etc.65 Given their
offshore nature, very few of these investments contributed to the
development of domestic capital markets.
More recently, the Chinese government has come to view FPI more
favorably, precisely because of its potential benefit for China’s onshore
markets.66 For example, there has been a shortage on China’s stock market
of experienced institutional investors with long-term investment
objectives;67 so in 2002, the domestic stock and bond markets were opened
in a limited fashion to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs).68 In
2006 the QFII regime was further liberalized.69 Similarly, in the field of PE

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (arguing that the above policy was not in fact effective, that
what passed as FDI was in many cases financial investment, and that this occurred because
Chinese domestic enterprises, faced with a dysfunctional domestic financial service sector,
obtained foreign financing under the pretension of seeking technological know-how).
63. See International Monetary Fund, Portfolio Investment: Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2010) [hereinafter CPIS]; State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, China’s International
Investment
Position
2007
(in
Mandarin),
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/200806/21/content_1023491.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter SAFE].
64. See CPIS, supra note 63; SAFE, supra note 63; Elena L. Nguyen, International
Investment Position of the United States at Year-End 2007, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Survey of Current Business Online, July 2008, at 9, available at
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2008/07%20July/0708_iip.pdf (last visited Feb. 14. 2010).
65. See International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide
(2001), at 11-12 (IMF data collection attempts to identify residence of issuer regardless of
place of listing); ALICE DE JONGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CHINA’S H-SHARE
MARKET 56 (Edward Elgar 2008) (“By December 2003, a total of 93 Chinese companies had
issued shares outside of China, raising 27.1 billion US dollars in total.” This number should
also have risen substantially by 2006.).
66. See Andrew McGinty & Andrew Godwin, The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: 'ew
QFII Rules Open a Share Market, CHINA LAW AND PRACTICE, Dec. 2002 at 10.
67. Id.
68. See id. Before 2002, foreigners were allowed to trade Chinese stock in the
domestic exchanges only among themselves, in a separate market from where domestic
investors traded. See also STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET 50–55 (Profile Books,
The Economist Series 2003).
69. See Taylor Hui & Vivien Teu, China QFII Rules Revised—Significant
Developments for Foreign Fund Managers, CHINA LAW AND PRACTICE, Nov. 2006 at 9.
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and VC investing, it is thought that foreign institutions and professionals
operating in such asset classes possess important expertise in evaluating and
improving business performance and governance, and their participation is
needed if the field is to develop quickly.70 The latest signs of this policy
orientation include the Ministry of Commerce’s decision in March 2009 to
delegate the authority to approve new foreign-invested venture capital
enterprises with total capital not exceeding $100 million71 to provincial
authorities, which are generally regarded as more eager to promote foreign
investments then national agencies.72
Not surprisingly, because China’s inbound taxation has
traditionally focused on FDI (as has the rest of the regulatory system), its
operation has faltered as FPI in China expands. For example, at the onset
of the QFII regime, it was immediately unclear how withholding taxes
would apply to income received by QFIIs.73 Should the tax exemption then
granted for repatriation of profits on FDI apply to dividends paid on stock
held by QFIIs as well? Should the tax on capital gain applicable to the sale
of FDI investments also apply to gain on the trading of stock where no
suitable withholding mechanisms have been put in place? If China were to
tax QFII income, how would it administer the granting of treaty benefits?
Until quite recently,74 in the absence of explicit guidance, QFIIs (and their
customers on behalf of whom QFIIs invested and traded in China) did not
have to pay Chinese income tax on many types of investment income
without knowing whether there was any legal basis for this de facto
exemption or how long it would last.75 We will see further below that other
forms of FPI in China, for example, real estate investments,76 have
generated their share of long-standing questions about appropriate tax
treatments. While, unlike the onshore investment fund and QFII areas,
there has been no significant liberalization in recent years in these other
areas of FPI, if any momentum gathers for clarifying the tax treatment of
70. See, e.g., Yan Zhou, Blackstone Sets Up 'ew Private Equity Fund in Pudong,
CHINA DAILY, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/200908/18/content_8581500.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
71. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
72. See Shang zi han [2009] 9 [Notice Regarding the Approval of Foreign-Invested
Venture Capital Enterprises and Venture Capital Management Enterprises] (promulgated by
the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 5, 2009); O’Melveny & Myers, China Law and Policy
'ewsflash: Deregulation of Foreign-invested RMB Funds and Managers of Private Equity,
Mar. 17, 2009 (on file with author).
73. See Kehong Wu, QFII Investments in Chinese Stock–A Feast of Tax Exemptions?
(in Mandarin), 2 INT’L TAXATION IN CHINA (shewai shuiwu) 73, 73–76 (2008).
74. See infra notes 144–49 and accompanying text.
75. See Kehong, supra note 73, at 74–75.
76. For a discussion of foreign real estate ownership, see infra notes 109-115 and
accompanying text.
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onshore funds and QFIIs, there may be implications for the whole range of
FPI as well.
II. STATUTORY CONCEPT OF “ESTABLISHMENT,” ITS EVOLUTION AND
IMPORTANCE
Before I examine the existing interpretations of “establishment,” an
explanation is in order regarding the statutory framework within which the
concept has its place. China’s enterprise income tax and the individual
income tax (IIT) currently fall under two separate statutory regimes, and
“establishment,” a concept employed by the EIT Law, does not apply for
IIT purposes.77 In fact, not only is the concept inapplicable in connection
with individual taxpayers, but the current structure of the IIT also renders
the distinction between net- and gross-income taxation relatively
unimportant for foreign individuals. Under China’s Individual Income Tax
Law and underlying regulations,78 individuals are effectively classified as
residents and nonresidents on the basis of domicile and physical presence in
China,79 with residents being subject to taxation on worldwide income.80
Non-residents generally are not required to file income tax returns.81 Their
income from labor services performed in China, if not exempt under
domestic or treaty law,82 is taxed by way of withholding, and they are taxed
on other income at flat rates, also via withholding, regardless of nexus to
China.83 Moreover, the IIT allows few deductions and credits, and

77. The concept does not appear under the Individual Income Tax Law (promulgated
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, as last amended on Dec. 29, 2007), translated in
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter IIT Law] or its regulations
(Regulations on the Implementation of Individual Income Tax (promulgated by the State
Council, Feb.18, 2008, effective Jan. 28, 1994), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter IIT Law IR].
78. See IIT Law, supra note 77; IIT Law IR, supra note 77.
79. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 1; IIT Law IR, supra note 77, arts. 2, 3 and 6.
80. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 1.
81. See Guo shui fa [2006] 162 [Circular of the State Administration of Taxation
Concerning Printing and Distributing the Measures for the Self-Declaration of Individual
Income Tax] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce for Trial Implementation, Nov. 6,
2006) art. 4; see generally Wei Cui, China’s 'ew Personal Income Tax Return-Filing
Regime, 45 TAX NOTES INT’L 977 (2007).
82. Domestic law, following the treatment of dependent services in income tax treaties,
exempts compensation received by any nonresident individual who (1) is present in China
for less than 90 days during the year, and (2) receives payment from a foreign employer, (3)
the cost of which payment is not borne by a Chinese “establishment” of the employer. IIT
Law IR, supra note 77, art. 7. Actual income tax treaties usually extend the length of the
period in (1) to 183 days.
83. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 3; IIT Law IR, supra note 77, arts. 4 and 5.
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essentially only labor service income is taxed at progressive rates.84 The
only category of income received by an individual that is subject to genuine
net-income taxation is self-employment income.85 However, foreign
individuals are largely precluded by non-tax regulatory law from engaging
in activities that would generate such income.86
This might seem to limit the significance of the “establishment”
concept for Chinese inbound taxation, but a fundamental feature of the EIT
Law implies otherwise. The EIT Law treats all foreign entities in the same
way, as though they are corporations.87 No foreign pass-through entities are
recognized even though domestically, the pass-through concept applies to
partnerships and certain other entities.88 Thus, foreign partnerships, trusts,
etc., investing in China would all be subject to the test of whether they have
a Chinese establishment. In addition, for regulatory reasons, outside the
context of investments in real estate, foreign individuals rarely invest
directly into China (whether the nature of the investment is FDI or FPI),
and almost always use intermediate entities.89 As a result, despite its
absence from the IIT rules, the notion of “establishment” is relevant to
foreign individual investors in China as well.

84. See Li Jinyan, China’s Individual Income Tax: A 26-Year-Old Infant, 43 TAX
NOTES INT’L 297, 297 (2006).
85. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 6.
86. See General Principles of the Civil Law (promulgated by the 6th Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) art. 26, translated in LAWINFOCHINA
(generally, only citizens are permitted to register as “individual industrial and commercial
households,” i.e., sole proprietorships); see also Regulations on Individual Industrial and
Commercial Households art. 2 (State Council draft regulation circulated for public comment,
July
2009),
available
at
http://yijian.chinalaw.gov.cn/lismsPro/law_download/fulltext/1248161068168.doc
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
87. Article 1of the EIT Law defines enterprises subject to the enterprise income tax as
all organizations receiving income. Only specific types of entities formed in China (i.e.,
partnerships and single-individual-owner companies) are excluded from the definition. See
EIT Law IR, supra note 12, art. 2.
88. See generally Wei Cui, The Prospect of 'ew Partnership Taxation in China, 46
TAX NOTES INT’L 625 (2007) [hereinafter Prospect of 'ew Partnership Taxation].
89. Telephone Interview and written correspondence with both Lawrence Sussman,
Partner, O’Melveny & Myers and Shaolin Luo, Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, in
Beijing, China (Nov. 23, 2009) (written correspondence on file with author).
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Statutory and Quasi-Statutory Definitions90

Ever since the first tax statute applicable to foreign and foreigninvested companies was enacted in 1981,91 Chinese tax law has used the
concept of “establishment.” Under that statute—the Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax Law—income derived from a Chinese “establishment” was
taxed, after appropriate deductions, at graduated rates (with the top rate at
40%),92 whereas in the absence of an establishment, a foreign company
would be taxed at a flat 20% rate on the gross amount of any dividends,
interest, rent, royalties and other income from sources within China.93
Neither the law nor its implementing rules contained a concept that
characterized income as “effectively connected” with an “establishment.”94
Therefore, at least on paper, the 1981 law is consistent with a “force of
attraction” regime: as long as an “establishment” exists, all Chinese-source
income would be subject to net-basis taxation. It is unclear whether the law
was interpreted and enforced in this way, although the answer is likely to be
no.95
Under the Foreign Invested Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax Law of 1991, the consequences of having an “establishment”
in China were reformulated. Income effectively connected with the
“establishment” would still be taxed on a net-income basis, but Chinesesource income not effectively connected with an “establishment” was only

90. Within the Chinese legal system, material statutory terms and provisions are often
left to be defined and elaborated by the State Council instead of by the national legislature,
and the State Council is often the de facto ultimate decisionmaker in tax lawmaking. Thus,
the discussion here treats implementation regulations issued by the State Council as quasistatutory.
91. Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 13, 1981, effective Jan. 1, 1982), translated in ASIANLII (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1981 FEITL], replaced by Income Tax Law on Enterprises with
Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., April 9, 1991, effective July 1, 1991), translated in ASIANLII (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1991 FEITL].
92. 1981 FEITL, supra note 91, arts. 1-3.
93. Id. art. 11.
94. See Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law for Foreign Enterprises
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Feb. 21, 1982), translated in ASIANLII (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1982 FEITL IR].
95. Foreign taxpayers still face fragmented tax administration in China: presence or
activities in a particular locality could trigger tax return filing and other compliance
obligations enforced by the tax authorities in that particular locality, without regard to the
taxpayer’s other activities elsewhere. Therefore, a local tax bureau may not regard itself as
having the authority to tax a foreign company, which has an “establishment” within its
jurisdiction, on other income received elsewhere.
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subject to withholding tax on the gross amount.96 Moreover, the definition
of “establishment” itself was further developed. For example, according to
the 1981 FEITL, a “business agent” could constitute an establishment,97 but
no definition was provided for the term. By contrast, the regulations
implementing the 1991 FEITL explicitly defined business agent, albeit
narrowly focusing on trade-related agency activities.98 (As discussed
below, this narrow definition of a business agent allowed for a significant
2003 ruling in favor of foreign taxpayers in the VC fund context.)
Similarly, the non-agency, physical presence type of “establishment” was
redefined to include a larger variety of physical business presences.99
The 2007 EIT Law and its implementing regulations (which
together constitute what I call the “new EIT regime”) introduced what are
perhaps the most significant changes to the definition of “establishment” to
date. First, with respect to the agency type of establishment, the new law
would find such an “establishment” where “a nonresident enterprise
entrusts an agent to engage in production or trade, including signing
contracts or storing and delivering commodities on behalf of the [principal]
on a regular basis.”100 This is a broader definition of “business agents” than
under previous law, most fundamentally because it is tied to the agent’s
actions in production or trade (shengchan jingying), which potentially could
be interpreted to cover many activities 101. In similar fashion, the new law
no longer defines the physical presence type of “establishment” merely by
enumerating examples. Instead, it provides a catch-all category, “other

96. 1991 FEITL, supra note 91, art. 19. Although the statutory language states only
that Chinese-source income effectively connected with an “establishment” would be subject
to net-income taxation, subsequent regulations defined Chinese-source income as including
any income, even if arising outside China, that is effectively connected with a Chinese
establishment. See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law for
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the State
Council, June 30, 1991, effective July 1, 1991) art. 6., translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1991 FEITL IR]. This is based on an erroneous
understanding of the function of source rules, and has been corrected by the EIT Law and
the EIT Law IR.
97. 1982 FEITL IR, supra note 94, art. 2(1).
98. A business agent was defined as a person “engaged in business as an agent for the
principal and (1) regularly representing the principal in sourcing and purchasing, as well as
in signing purchase contracts and buying goods on the principal’s behalf; (2) entering into an
agency agreement or contract with the principal, regularly storing products or goods owned
by the principal and delivering these products or goods to other parties on the principal’s
behalf; or (3) being awarded the authority to regularly represent the principal in signing sales
contracts and in accepting purchase orders.” 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 4.
99. Id. art. 3.
100. EIT Law IR, supra note 12, art. 5.
101. See id.
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establishments engaged in production or trade.”102 The category of physical
establishments is thus also open-ended, and the main criterion for
determining its scope is whether there is engagement in “production or
trade.”103
How, then, is the term “production or trade” to be understood? The
answer is that although the term has been employed in the definition of
“establishment” from the beginning,104 it has never been defined in statutes,
administrative regulations, or agency rulings.
The closest that the law has come to defining the term is the
following. Regulations under both the 1981 FEITL and the 1991 FEITL
distinguished between two types of income: “income from production or
trade” and “other income.” Whereas “income from production or trade”
was defined, circularly, by enumeration of various industries and trades and
then a catch-all category of “other income from production or trade,”105
“other income” was defined as “dividend, interest, income from rental or
transfer of property, royalties and income from transfer of patents and
intellectual property rights, as well as income not derived from the carrying
on of a trade.”106 It would appear logical to infer from the distinction
between these two types of income that the mere holding or disposition of
stock, debt, tangible property, and intellectual property, which does not
generate “income from production or trade” but only “other income,”
would not constitute “production or trade.” This inference will be
particularly tempting for those familiar with the practice in the U.S. (and
similar practices in OECD countries) of distinguishing between mere
investments and the carrying on of a “trade or business.”107
However, the validity of this inference in the Chinese context is
doubtful, not because of any contrary interpretation of the term “production
or trade” but for an opposite and striking reason: no known official
pronouncement has ever relied on the distinction between “income from
production or trade” and “other income.” Indeed, perhaps precisely
because of a perceived lack of relevance of the distinction, it has been
eliminated in the new EIT Law and the regulations that have been issued so
far. This is, of course, rather ironic, since the new EIT regime has given the
government greater latitude in interpreting the meaning of both the physical

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 1982 FEITL IR, supra note 94, art. 2.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 4; 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 2.
107. See, e.g., Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941); Chang Hsiao Liang v.
Comm’r, 23 T.C. 1040 (1955); see also Ross, supra note 13, at 295, for a discussion of
OECD practice.
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presence and agency types of establishment,108 and the only articulated
criterion for such interpretation is whether there is engagement in
“production or trade.”
Against this background of interpretive vacuum, two administrative
announcements stand out in that they have directly delineated the scope of
“establishment.” I will examine these now, and consider to what extent
they shed light on “production or trade.”
B.

Administrative Announcements

In 1996, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) issued a
circular regarding rental income received by foreign enterprises. 109 It states
that if a foreign enterprise owns and rents out a house, building or other real
property in China, but has not set up an “establishment or site” to carry out
routine management of the property, it is subject to income tax on the rental
income it receives on a gross income basis at the withholding tax rate.110 If
the foreign enterprise entrusts an agent to manage the real property in
question (and if, where a relevant income tax treaty applies, the agent is not
an independent agent), then the foreign enterprise should be treated as
having an “establishment” in China and subject to tax on a net income
basis.111
The background of this circular is unclear, but its aim was probably
to ensure some type of income tax collection on real estate rent received by
foreigners, without particular emphasis on differential treatment between
income derived from an “establishment” and income in the absence of an
establishment. For example, in its instructions on the implementation of the
circular, the Beijing State Tax Bureau explicitly stated that, for rental
income treated as effectively connected with an “establishment” under the
SAT circular, a deemed profit of 30% should be used in computing tax
liability.112 Had the 33% enterprise income tax rate been applied, the
resulting 9.9% tax burden would be close to the 10% withholding tax rate
on income not effectively connected with an establishment.113 Tax bureaus
108. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
109. Guo shui fa [1996] 212 [Notice Regarding Taxing Rental Income of Foreign
Enterprises from Real Property within China] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Taxation,
Nov. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Guo shui fa [1996] 212].
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Jing guo shui [1997] 27 [Notice Regarding the Taxation of Rental Income of
Foreign Enterprises by Renting Out Buildings in China] (promulgated by the Beijing State
Tax Bureau, Jan. 27, 1997).
113. See Guo fa [2000] 37 [Notice Regarding Reduced Taxation of Interest and Other
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in Shanghai allowed a similar approach and also provided for a deemed
profit of 30%.114 This suggests that the distinction made in the SAT
circular was merely theoretical and did not have the intention of either
encouraging foreign investment in real estate or securing greater revenue
for the government.115
Nonetheless, the text of the circular suggests, at least in the real
estate context, the distinction between merely holding an asset and
operating or using that asset.116 This resonates with a well-established body
of U.S. law, going back to at least the 1940s, providing that mere real estate
holding without servicing and maintaining the property does not give rise to
a U.S. trade or business.117 Conversely, under U.S. law, if a nonresident
engages an agent to actively manage real property in the U.S., then the
nonresident generally would be treated as engaging in a U.S. trade or
business.118 The 1996 SAT circular seems to have provided an extremely
condensed version of this doctrine, and it is consistent with the earlier tax
regulations characterizing rental income as other than “income from
production or trade.”119
A second administrative announcement on the scope of
“establishment” came in 2003120 and was associated with a well-known
government effort to promote venture capital investments in China.121 At
the start of 2003, several government ministries jointly issued regulations

Income from China Derived by Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council,
Nov. 18, 2000).
114. Hu shui wai [1997] 90 [Notice Regarding the Taxation of Rental Income of
Foreign Enterprises by Renting Out Buildings in China] (promulgated by the Shanghai State
and Local Tax Bureaus, July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Hu shui wai [1997] 90].
115. By contrast, in most of the early U.S. cases in which taxpayers and the government
disputed whether real estate investment in the U.S. constituted a U.S. trade or business,
important differences in tax liability existed (e.g., taxpayers sought to claim large
deductions). See, e.g., Lewenhaupt v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 151, 162 (1953), aff’d, 221 F.2d 227
(9th Cir. 1955).
116. Guo shui fa [1996] 212, supra note 109.
117. See, e.g., Neill v. Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 197 (1942); De Amodio v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.
894 (1960).
118. De Amodio, 34 T.C. at 904–905 (citing Lewenhaupt v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 151
(1953)).
119. See Hu shui wai [1997] 90, supra note 114 (Shanghai tax authorities held further
that “routine management” of real property involved the capacity to sign rental agreements,
collect rent, to improve, repair and decorate the property, and “other substantive
management activities,” but the mere hiring of persons to clean, guard, or perform daily
maintenance of the property is not sufficient).
120. Guo shui fa [2003] 61 [Notice Regarding the Payment of Enterprise Income Tax by
Foreign Invested Venture Capital Companies] (promulgated by the State Admin. of
Taxation, June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Guo shui fa [2003] 61].
121. See supra Section I.B.
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on the formation of foreign-invested venture capital investment enterprises
(FIVCIEs); a few months later, the SAT issued clarifications as to how such
enterprises would be taxed.122 According to the SAT pronouncement (the
2003 VC Tax Rules),123 if a FIVCIE takes a “legal person” form (i.e., its
investors have limited liability), then it is taxed as a Chinese corporation.124
If, on the other hand, it takes the “non-legal person” form (i.e., some
investors bear unlimited liability), then the enterprise and its investors have
a choice of computing their tax liabilities either at the enterprise or the
investor level, but are not taxed at both levels.125
How, though, should the foreign investors be taxed if they
determine their tax liabilities separately? Should they be treated as having
an “establishment” and taxed on a net-income basis, or should they be
subject only to gross-income taxation? The 2003 VC Tax Rules provide
that, generally, investors in non-legal person FIVCIE should be treated as
having establishments within China and be taxed accordingly.126 However,
if the FIVCIE does not have its own management office, and does not
directly manage and advise its investments, but instead contracts with a
separate management entity to conduct all of its daily affairs and manage its
investments, then investors would not be treated as having an
“establishment” in China by virtue of investing in the FIVCIE.127
While the circular contains no explicit argument for the conclusion,
the underlying reasoning appears to be the following. As previously
discussed, in general, a foreigner’s “establishment or site” in China can take
the form either of a physical presence (e.g., a business office) or a business
agent. Under Chinese commercial law, the investors in a non-legal person
VC fund own the assets and rights of the business and are principals of its
agents.128 Therefore, any business office or agent of the fund itself would
be deemed, for non-tax purposes, to be the office or agent of the fund’s
investors. In the scenario described in the 2003 VC Tax Rules in which
foreign investors are treated as not having an establishment, tax authorities

122. Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See also 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 7 (stating that participants in a “nonlegal person” cooperative joint venture may elect to pay EIT separately, in lieu of the joint
venture itself).
126. Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120.
127. Id.
128. Implementation Rules on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, arts. 50 and
52 (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. Coop., Aug. 7, 1995, effective
Aug.
7,
1995),
available
at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/RegulationsonForei
gnInvestment/t20060620_51088.jsp (in translation) (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
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seem to have assumed that the fund does not have its own business office in
China. (Whether the office of the external manager should be attributed to
the fund was not considered.)129 In addition, even if the external manager is
an agent of the fund and its investors, there is no agency establishment.
This is because under the tax law then in effect, only business agents
engaged in the trading of goods were deemed to give rise to
“establishments” for tax purposes.130
Unlike the 1996 SAT circular on foreign ownership of real estate,
the 2003 VC Tax Rules had a genuinely positive effect, in that they enabled
foreign investors to operate VC funds in China without the fear of being
subject to net-income basis taxation.131 Virtually all FIVCIEs formed until
recently (before the revised Partnership Enterprise Law took effect) used
the management company structure endorsed by the 2003 VC Tax Rules.
However, as the foregoing analysis shows, the SAT’s position is technically
based not on characterizing VC investing as a type of investment activity,
and thus as different from “production or trade.” Instead, it is based on a
narrow definition of “business agents”—a situation that the new EIT regime
has already changed. Under that new regime, the questions can now be
raised: Why isn’t the external manager a business agent of the fund and its
investors? If it is, why don’t the foreign investors have a business agent
“establishment” through the manager?
Taken together, the 1996 real estate circular and the 2003 VC Tax
Rules demonstrate that the government has yet to confront the distinct tax
issues raised by the developments in business forms described in Section I.
These issues include basic items such as recognition of what is at stake in
distinguishing net-income and gross-income taxation, as well as specialized
items such as understanding the proper treatment of partnership and
partnership-like forms. And most centrally, both rulings arose in the
context of FPI, where a crucial issue is whether investment activities should
be included in the scope of “production or trade” and therefore of
“establishment.”132 The 2003 VC Tax Rules skirted that crucial issue,
whereas the earlier ruling only apparently addressed it (without embracing
its full consequences).

129. I.R.C. § 864(c)(5) (2009) (attributing the fixed place of business of a nonindependent agent to a foreign person).
130. See supra note 98.
131. Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120.
132. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
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'ew Uncertainties

Several recent developments in Chinese tax administration
highlight both the urgent need for the immediate clarification of the scope
of “establishment” and how, in the absence of sustained policy focus on the
matter, parties can take widely divergent and inconsistent approaches to
taxing foreign investment.133 To begin, the 2003 VC Tax Rules134 appear to
have been made obsolete—ironic in light of the already paltry amount of
guidance available regarding fund formation.135 This is presumably due to
the fact that the legal basis of those rules—the Implementation Regulations
for the Foreign Invested Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law
of 1991—was replaced by the EIT Law on January 1, 2008.136 Strictly
speaking, therefore, there is no longer any valid legal guidance regarding
the tax treatment of foreign invested venture capital investment
enterprises.137 However, because other central government ministries have
issued several circulars in favor of the operation of FIVCIEs,138 market
participants appear to assume that it is not the government’s intention to
adopt radically new and unfavorable tax rules for FIVCIEs, and new funds
of this type continue to be formed.139 While the 2003 VC Tax Rules can no
longer be shown to local tax authorities as binding on the treatment of
FIVCIEs, they are still presented as a reasonable way of taxing such entities
in the absence of further guidance.140

133. I am grateful to Lawrence Sussman and Min Huang at the Beijing office of
O’Melveny & Myers for discussion of the developments reported in this Section.
134. See Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120.
135. There has been no formal announcement of revocation of the circular. Instead, it is
shown as “void in whole” on the website of the State Administration of Taxation. State
Admin.
of
Taxation,
http://202.108.90.178/guoshui/action/GetArticleView1.do?id=3716&flag=1 (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010).
136. See 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 7 (stating that non-legal person cooperative
joint ventures may be exempt from entity level taxation). There is no similar provision
under the EIT Law or EIT Law Implementation Regulations.
137. Some have gone so far as to suggest that such enterprises are no longer exempt
from entity-level taxation. See Kevin Wang, Foreign Investors in RMB Funds May Face
Double Taxation, 49 TAX NOTES INT’L 742, 742–43 (2008). As discussed in the ensuing
text, the market has discounted the suggestion of such a radical change in policy.
138. See supra note 71 for deregulatory actions taken by the Ministry of Commerce; see
also Huizongfu [2008] 125 [Replies to Questions Regarding the Application of Foreign
Exchange for Domestic Equity Investments by Foreign Invested Venture Capital Investment
Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, Nov. 14, 2008)
(facilitating foreign exchange conversion for FIVCIE investment activities).
139. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Sussman, Managing Partner, O’Melveny &
Myers LLP, in Beijing, China (Nov. 23, 2009).
140. Id.
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Needless to say, this state of affairs presents a significant legal risk
to investors in FIVCIEs, if only because there is no legal impediment to the
government reversing the treatment in the 2003 VC Tax Rules. But just as
importantly, as discussed above,141 the underlying reasoning in that
regulation is in tension with the expansion of the scope of “business agent”
type of “establishment” under the EIT Law Implementation Regulations.
Thus, even if the 2003 VC Tax Rules had not been made obsolete, there
would have been a question of how it could be reconciled with the new EIT
regime. Another source of concern is that foreign invested partnerships are
widely regarded as a competing business form for the formation of RMB
funds that will be available soon,142 whereas the 2003 VC Tax Rules, by
their terms, do not apply to partnerships.143 The adoption of new tax rules
for foreign invested partnerships could trigger new scrutiny of the rationale
underlying the 2003 VC Tax Rules. In that scenario, taxpayers and their
advisors may be called upon to freshly defend, for example, why holding an
equity interest in a partnership or a partnership-like entity in China (which
has assets and activities in China) should not constitute an “establishment”
in China. As we will see in Section III below, such a defense involves
complex policy considerations and is not easy to carry out.
Aggravating this legal uncertainty in the fund formation area is the
manner in which Chinese tax authorities have approached other related
areas of foreign investment seemingly without awareness of the importance
of the “establishment” concept, promulgating rules that imply contradictory
positions. Two regulations that have recently attracted practitioners’
attention illustrate this point. The first is a circular issued by the SAT
(State Administration of Taxation) at the beginning of 2009 that initiated
the practice of withholding income tax paid to QFIIs (qualified foreign
institutional investors) by companies with stock or bonds listed on the
Chinese securities markets.144 This regulation (Circular 47) brought an end
to the previous status quo whereby QFIIs were not subject to any
withholding tax at all (even though there appeared to be no legal basis for
such an exemption).145 A potential silver lining in Circular 47, however, is

141. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text.
143. The 2003 VC Tax Rules apply only to entities formed under the Provisions
Concerning the Administration of Foreign-Funded Venture Investment Enterprises. See Guo
shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120; Provisions Concerning the Administration of ForeignFunded Venture Investment Enterprises, supra note 47.
144. Guo shui han [2009] 47 [Notice Regarding the Withholding of Enterprise Income
Tax with Respect to Dividends and Interest Paid to QFII by Chinese Resident Enterprises]
(promulgated by the State Admin. of Taxation, Jan. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Guo shui han
[2009] 47].
145. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text; see also Jinji Wei, A View on
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that it could be read as resolving an issue regarding “establishment” for
QFIIs. As discussed in Section II.A, under the EIT Law Implementation
Regulations, a foreign entity may be deemed to have an “establishment” in
China by operating through a business agent, even one that is independent
in nature.146 Under this regulatory language, the QFIIs—foreign mutual
funds, insurance companies, and other asset management companies—may
all theoretically be deemed to have establishments in China via their
onshore custodians and trading agents. Although this issue may be
mitigated for QFIIs that are eligible for treaty benefits (as treaties generally
provide that the conduct of business through independent agents does not
give rise to permanent establishments),147 not all QFIIs (or all customers
that have accounts with QFIIs) are formed in treaty jurisdictions.
Therefore, the question whether such foreign investors could be deemed to
have “establishment” in China may remain unanswered.
Circular 47, by providing for the imposition of withholding tax on
QFIIs, could be read as conclusively addressing this issue: since all QFIIs,
regardless of whether they can claim the benefits of tax treaties,148 are
treated as subject to the withholding tax and not net-income basis tax, it
could be inferred that no QFII is deemed to have an “establishment” in
China through actions by independent agents alone.149 This reading of
Circular 47, however, is contradicted by another regulation the SAT issued
during the same week. In this latter, widely discussed regulation (Decree
19),150 the SAT requires all nonresident enterprises that provide labor
services151 in China to (1) register for tax purposes shortly after entering
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors in China, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 275, 277 (2009).
The regulation remains silent, however, on whether and how capital gain realized by QFIIs
is to be taxed, thus leaving a large vacuum in this area.
146. See EIT Law IR, supra note 12.
147. See, e.g., United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed
and Developing Countries (2001) art. 14.
148. Guo shui han [2009] 47, supra note 144.
149. Under EIT Law IR, income is effectively connected with an “establishment” if the
“establishment” “possesses, manages, or controls properties through which income is
earned.” EIT Law IR, supra note 12, art. 8. Since the securities owned by QFIIs are held
(possessed) by onshore custodians, it is unlikely that such custodians are deemed to be
establishments but the interest and dividend income is not deemed to be “effectively
connected.”
150. See State Administration of Taxation Decree [2009] 19 [Provisional Administrative
Measures on the Tax Administration of Contract Projects and Service Provisions for
Nonresidents] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Taxation, Jan. 20, 2009, effective Mar.
1, 2009) [hereinafter State Administration of Taxation Decree [2009] 19]; Vivian Jiang &
Koko Tang, China Issues Guidance on Tax Treatment of 'onresidents on Contract Projects,
2009 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Feb. 24, 2009, at 34–35.
151. All labor services are included in the scope of the regulation. See State
Administration of Taxation Decree [2009] 19, supra note 150, art. 3. The same regulation
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into contracts for the provision of such services,152 and (2) file income tax
returns on both quarterly and annual bases.153 Although nonresident
enterprises may claim on their returns that their activities do not constitute
permanent establishments under relevant treaties and therefore do not
generate taxable income in China, there appears to be no exemption for the
return filing requirement.154
The only circumstance under which the EIT Law requires
nonresidents to file income tax returns in China is when such nonresidents
have establishments in China.155 The implicit position of Decree 19,
therefore, seems to be that any provision of labor service in China—
however transient and regardless of whether a fixed place of business is
involved, no matter whether it is pursued through dependent or independent
agents, and no matter whether it is pursued in the course of “production or
trade”—would give rise to an “establishment” in China. This implicit
position is contradictory to the implied position in Circular 47. Moreover,
if it can be correctly attributed to the government, it will also amount to a
fundamental and untenable expansion in the interpretation of
“establishment.” This expansion is untenable because it implies that any
physical presence in China in connection with service provision would
constitute sufficient business nexus for a foreign entity to be taxed on a netincome basis in China (absent treaty protection). Already, at least some
nonresident enterprises are resisting compliance with Decree 19.156
As surprising as it may seem that the SAT would adopt measures
that are at once careless and contradictory, it is equally surprising how few
tax practitioners in China have voiced criticism of Decree 19 for lacking
legal authority.157 This silence makes it (painfully) obvious that the
domestic law concept of “establishment” has been neglected by Chinese tax
administrators and tax practitioners alike, and that there is a widespread
failure to recognize that the concept should have some substance of its own,
independent of the treaty concept of establishment.

also covered contract projects that nonresident enterprises have entered into (e.g.,
construction, installation, assembly, decoration and exploitation).
152. Id. arts. 5–6.
153. Id. arts. 12–13.
154. Id. art. 13.
155. EIT Law, supra note 2, art. 51.
156. Interview with Lawrence Sussman, supra note 139.
157. For existing commentary on Decree 19, see Jiang & Tang, supra note 150, at 34;
Peng Tao & Sang Kim, A Brief Examination of Recent Chinese Tax Rules on 'onresident
Enterprises, TAXES, Dec. 2009, at 39–52.
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III. POLICY ISSUES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF “ESTABLISHMENT”
A.

General Tax Policy Toward Inbound Portfolio Investment

In this Section, I turn to the policy considerations that should guide
Chinese lawmakers and tax authorities in responding to the issues
highlighted in the last Section. The logic of the examination is as follows.
In connection with a range of transactions either actively carried out today
or anticipated for the near future, and including, among others, QFII
activities on Chinese securities markets,158 passive investments in domestic
investment funds and in real estate, it is reasonable to assume that foreign
investors would prefer not to be treated as having establishments in
China.159 There is a range of tax rules that could deliver this result.
Viewing the question through the lens of U.S. tax law, for instance, one
could suggest, for a start, a doctrine that treats largely passive investments
as different in nature from business activities, or, in Chinese terminology,
from “production or trade.”160 But further, since the perceived benefit of
inbound portfolio investment is not so much that it supplies additional
capital to China, as it is that it would introduce sophisticated investors
whose presence would contribute to capital market development, the
performance of certain investment-related activities, such as due diligence
and negotiation, trading, and exercise of investor rights, should be
anticipated. Such activities should not trigger adverse tax consequences.
One could address the concerns that would arise here for, for example,
QFIIs, by excluding some types of securities trading from “production or
trade,” analogous to the safe harbor for trading in stocks and securities of
Code Section 864(b)(2)(A).161 Investments in onshore funds may also
benefit from such exclusion, depending on the nature of the funds’
activities.
How should one evaluate proposals like this? Clearly, the question
is whether introducing such U.S.-style rules is consistent with China’s
current policy objectives with respect to foreign investment. Even some
158. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
159. This is mainly because the lower rates associated with the withholding tax (10% or
less) generally more than compensate for the lack of deductions when income is taxed on a
gross basis. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
160. This could be thought of along the lines of U.S. judicial decisions that date back at
least to Higgins. Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941). Such a doctrine would have to
cope with variations in factual circumstances that could challenge one’s intuition about what
is passive. The analog would be the judicial elaboration of the “considerable, continuous
and regular” standard for “U.S. trade or business.” See Sicular & Sobol, supra note 13, at
735–43.
161. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A) (2009).
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preliminary reflection is sufficient to cast doubt on any easy assumption
that it must be good for China to encourage foreign investment through tax
rules. Instead, I will argue that the appropriate design of tax rules depends
on understanding not only the wider economic context, but also the role tax
policy plays relative to other regulatory policy. In particular, one should
distinguish two conceptions of the role that tax policy might play. On the
first conception, tax policy goals regarding foreign investment are set by
general economic policy goals, and one may simply consider whether tax
rules would in themselves advance such general goals. On the second
conception, tax policy is a subordinate instrument to other regulatory
policy, and it is only after considering the effects of other regulatory policy
that one can choose objectives for tax policy. I will argue below that it is
the second conception that more realistically characterizes the function of
Chinese tax policy toward foreign investment. Interestingly, it is also on
this second conception that arguments for rules favorable to foreign
investors can be more cogently advanced.
1.

Assuming Similar Functions for Tax and Regulatory Policies

One potential model is to introduce U.S.-style rules to Chinese
inbound taxation. To consider whether this would be appropriate, it is
useful briefly to recall the historical origin of some of the current U.S. rules.
Some fundamental components of current U.S. inbound tax system are the
result of economic policy decisions that informed both tax and non-tax
regulatory policies.162 The most important example of this is perhaps the
Foreign Investors Tax Act (FITA) of 1966.163 In the early 1960s, the U.S.
faced a substantial balance-of-payment problem.164 Despite a current
account surplus from exports and significant current earnings on foreign
investment, large outflows of U.S. investment capital were depleting the
U.S. gold reserve and threatening the stability of the dollar.165 The
Kennedy and Johnson administrations offered comprehensive tax and nontax policy responses to this situation, both by discouraging, or reducing the
need for, certain types of outbound investment,166 and by encouraging
investment into the U.S.167 These responses called for not only steps by the
162. See Ross, supra note 13, at 288–90.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. With respect to outbound investments, for instance, tax policy responses
included the enactment of controlled foreign corporation legislation and the interest
equalization tax.
167. The imperative of improving the U.S. gold reserve was indeed so clear that even
short-term deposits by foreigners in the United States, which “would not reduce the U.S.
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Treasury and Congress to change tax rules, but also various actions by other
government agencies as well as “the U.S. financial community” and U.S.based international corporations.168 The tax policy proposals that resulted
in FITA, which abolished the force-of-attraction regime and enacted the
trading safe harbors of Section 864(b), were accompanied by many other
policy proposals aimed at inducing foreigners to purchase U.S. securities.169
Suppose that we conceive the design of Chinese inbound tax rules
in general, and the interpretation of “establishment” in particular, as aimed
at affecting foreign investments in a similar comprehensive fashion.170 In
that case, one would have to note immediately that China’s current
international investment position is diametrically the opposite of the U.S.’
in the early 1960s,171 and there is currently considerable official reservation
about inbound investments. In the last few years, China has run a strong
current account surplus and drawn large amounts of FDI, with the result
that it now has accumulated the biggest foreign reserve in the world.172 In
addition to trade and FDI-related inflows, very sizeable amounts of other
capital inflow are also present, although it has been difficult to identify the
precise magnitude.173 This additional inflow of capital is viewed by many
observers to be the result of China’s fixed exchange rate policy and the
expectation that renminbi will appreciate.174 Although disagreement exists
as to the extent to which the rapid capital inflows comprise “hot money”—
in no small measure because there is disagreement about what is “hot
money”175—the economic consequences of the inflow are evident: China’s

payments deficit as customarily defined,” were to be encouraged, as they would “reduce the
volume of liquid dollar assets that foreign central banks might use to buy gold.” Report to
the President of the United States From the Task Force on Promoting Increased Foreign
Investment in United States Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for
United States Corporations Operating Abroad, 13 (1964) available at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1960/1964_0427_TaskForceForeign.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
168. See generally id. Other government agencies involved included the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve, and the Department of State.
169. Id. at 13.
170. This would not be completely appropriate. See infra notes 191–94 and
accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
172. Andrew Batson, China's Reserves Expand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2010, at A-10.
173. See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 8–12; Calla Wiemer, The Currency: A Tisket,
a Tasket, a Band 'ot a Basket, 9.2 CHINA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY, at 42–46 (2005). The
difficulty with identifying other inflows has to do with the uncertain amount of reserve
increases attributable to appreciation in official asset holdings.
174. See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 10, 12.
175. The term “hot money” typically refers to speculative flows of capital—particularly
flows into countries with weak financial markets and institutions—that could potentially
switch directions within a short time. See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 10.
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foreign reserve is more and more likely to exceed the amount of optimal
reserves, and the indirect addition to the domestic monetary base may
contribute to inflationary pressure.176 Moreover, it has been suggested that
absent a currency revaluation, and as long as the domestic savings rate
continues to exceed the rate of investment, the accumulation of reserves
will continue.177 An analogy has indeed been drawn between this situation
and a particular era in U.S. economic history: not the 1960s with large
capital outflow and balance of payment problem under the Bretton Woods
system, but the gilded age of the 1920s.178
Economists disagree as to whether China should try to change this
state of affairs by revaluing the renminbi.179 In any case, the Chinese
government has taken a series of ad hoc measures to mitigate the risk of
high domestic liquidity and the non-optimality of high reserves. For
example, it has loosened capital controls for outbound investments by
Chinese individuals180 and encouraged Chinese state-owned enterprises to
invest abroad.181 It has also relaxed requirements for repatriation of profits
of foreign operations.182 With respect to inbound investments, foreign
exchange control has been tightened,183 and a cautious approach has been

176. See Michael Pettis & Logan Wright, Hot Money Poses Risks to China’s Stability,
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 13, 2008, at 9.
177. See generally Calla Wiemer, Don’t Bet on the Yuan, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REVIEW, September 2008, at 23 [hereinafter Don’t Bet on the Yuan].
178. Michael Pettis, Money Matters: It’s the Banking System, 'ot External Debt, That’s
Scary, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 2008, at 12.
179. China has already allowed the renminbi to float with respect to the dollar within a
certain expanded range, but some argue that this is insufficient to deter speculative inflow.
See Andrew Peaple, China Fights Speculative Hordes, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704586504574653890470562198.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010). For a contrary view, see generally Don’t Bet on the Yuan, supra
note 177.
180. For a helpful overview of China’s foreign currency regime and the capital control
measures to sustain a fixed exchange rate and large foreign reserves, see Thomas Hall,
Controlling for Risk: An Analysis of China’s System of Foreign Exchange and Exchange
Rate Management, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 433, 464 (2004).
181. For a review of recent policies encouraging outbound investment, see Daniel H.
Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, China’s Changing Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Profile:
Drivers and Policy Implications, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 2009), available at
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1245 (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010).
182. Hui fa [2009] 30 [State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Regulations on
Foreign Exchange Administration of the Overseas Direct Investment of Domestic
Institutions] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, Sept. 13, 2009) art.4
(stating that foreign exchange earned can be kept overseas).
183. See Hui zong fa [2008] 142 [Notice Regarding Operational Issues in Enhancing the
Management of Payment Settlement in Foreign Exchange by Foreign Invested Enterprises]
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taken particularly with respect to real estate investments.184 These
developments are best viewed as instinctive reactions by the relevant
agencies and not as carefully considered new policies. Nonetheless, they
represent the complete opposite of U.S. policy toward cross border
investments in the 1960s, and, as long as the government continues to resist
appreciation of the renminbi or other fundamental economic undertakings,
they are likely to persist.
In light of this background, it would appear that any change in the
tax system providing new inducements to foreign investment in China is
unlikely because it would not fit the current, broader official attitude toward
foreign investment. In particular, following the American model in
delineating the boundary between net-income and gross-income taxation
would seem to produce inconsistencies between tax policy and other
policies. This could be said with respect both to the measure of excluding
activities of trading securities from net-income taxation in the style of Code
Section 864(b)(2), and the Higgins-style, more conservative and more
longstanding measure of excluding passive investment holding from netincome taxation under case law.185 Instead, it seems more consistent for
China to maintain the status quo, even if that means keeping the
interpretation of “establishment” in its muddled state.
However, the foregoing reasoning is based on a conception of tax
policy as designed to target inbound investment in general, pari passu with
non-tax regulatory policy. In reality, regulatory policy toward foreign
investment has traditionally been dominant in China, whereas tax policy
occupied a secondary role. Put differently, the range of transactions that tax
rules are allowed to affect is antecedently shaped by regulatory policy. And
insofar as tax policy and regulatory policy play different roles, they may
also take on different characters.
2.

Assuming That Tax and Regulatory Polices Have Different
Functions

The most important feature of Chinese economic policy toward
foreign investment is, of course, capital control.186 The country’s capital
(promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, Aug. 29, 2008).
184. Jian zhu fang [2006] 171 [Opinions on Regulation of Approval and Administration
of Foreign Investment in the Real Estate Market] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce, Aug. 14, 2006).
185. While excluding trading activities from net-income taxation is not a prevalent
international practice, excluding passive income is common at least among OECD countries.
See Ross, supra note 13, at 332.
186. See generally Prasad & Wei, supra note 59.
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account is only partially open, and only a selected group of foreign
investments are allowed into China.187 As mentioned earlier, FPI (both the
debt and equity varieties) and foreign loans into China have been and still
are relatively restricted, with FDI tending to dominate capital inflows.188
Even FDI is restricted to limited sectors.189 Moreover, once inside China,
financing options for FDI projects are relatively limited, again partially as a
result of the policy of capital control and the foreign exchange regulations
that implement it.190
In striking contrast with this picture of severe restrictions,
traditional tax policy toward FDI—which, starting in 2008, is being
gradually phased out by the new EIT regime—had been extremely
favorable.191 Approved FDI projects received generous tax incentives and
tax holidays,192 resulting in much lighter tax burdens than those borne by
domestically-owned enterprises.193 But it would be a mistake to think that
these inducements constituted the tax policy embodiment of a general
favorable economic policy toward foreign investment, forgetting the careful
selection that foreign investments have to go through. The tax incentives
and holidays were available only to FDI of particular types,194 and should
be thought of as a targeted subsidy, extended to projects that are preselected by non-tax agencies. Put differently, instead of controlling the
nature and form of foreign investment, tax policy tried to (positively) affect
the quantity of such investments.
To answer these questions, some further methodological issues
must be clarified. First, if favorable tax rules were to provide an incentive
for increased foreign investment, it must be the case that foreign investors
are in a position to respond to this incentive. For example, a key aspect in
the current regulation of foreign investment in Chinese securities markets
(i.e., the QFII regime) is a quota on the overall volume of such
investments.195 If the demand for Chinese securities on the part of foreign
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. In addition to the economic policy of capital control, regulatory barriers such as
lengthy approval processes also raise the cost of foreign investment, leading commentators
to conclude that “in terms of the overall legal regime, it is not obvious that China makes for
a particularly attractive FDI destination.” See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 18-20.
191. See Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for
International Tax Debates, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 671–74 (2007).
192. See id. at 678–79.
193. See id. at 677, 690–91.
194. See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text.
195. In December, 2007, the overall quota for initial QFII investment was raised from
$10 billion to $30 billion. See, inter alia, Hou Lei, China to Expand QFII Quota, CHINA
DAILY, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-03/07/content_6518464.htm
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investors is higher than this quota, the quota sets an effective ceiling on the
volume of investment; more favorable tax treatments would not induce a
larger volume, and would instead simply offer existing investors a windfall.
This would not be effective tax policy. In contrast, if a favorable tax
treatment is targeted as a threshold issue—foreign investors would invest
only if a certain treatment is available and would not invest otherwise—
then the justification for the treatment is stronger. To put it another way, it
must be specified at what point on the demand curve are tax rules intended
to affect investor behavior.
Second, it is important to specify what it means to treat foreign
investments favorably. For example, under China’s prior FDI tax regime,
favorable treatment of FDI meant more than that the effective corporate tax
rate was lower than in many other countries.196 Instead, resident enterprises
are divided into two groups: those that had significant foreign-ownership
(FIEs, with 25% or more foreign-ownership), and those that had greater
than 75% domestic ownership.197 FIEs enjoyed better tax treatment from
lower tax rates, greater use of deductions, and other measures.198 This
discriminatory treatment—“supra-national” treatment for foreign
investment199—led to serious distortions, including, most importantly,
efforts by domestic capital to disguise itself as foreign capital investing in
China.200
Any proposal for new favorable treatments of foreign
investments that creates significant risks of this type of distortion, it seems,
should be avoided.
These considerations suggest that any novel tax treatment of
foreign investment needs to be of a type that is neutral between domestic

(last visited Feb. 14, 2010); Jiang Yuxia, China Triples QFII Quota Ahead of Key Meetings
with
U.S.
Officials,
CHINA
VIEW,
Dec.
10,
2007,
available
at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/10/content_7226220.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
196. Li, supra note 191, at 696.
197. See 1991 FEITL, supra note 91, art.2 (defining FIEs as including equity joint
ventures, cooperative joint ventures, and wholly foreign owned enterprises).
198. Li, supra note 191, at 690–91.
199. For a brief discussion on the international investment law concept of national
treatment in China, see Jian Zhou, 'ational Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A
Comparative Study from a Chinese Perspective, 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 39, 47–48 (2000).
200. See Renqing Jin, Minister of Finance, The Necessity and Juncture of Release of the
Legislation of Enterprise Income Taxation, Address to the National People’s Congress
before the deliberation of the adoption of the EIT Law, (Mar. 8, 2007), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-03/08/content_5816843.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2010). The privileged treatment of FDI contributed to the phenomenon of “roundtripping”:
domestic capital being moved offshore and reinvested into China. See also Qinghua Xu &
A.W. Granwell, Round-Tripping: The Chinese Approach to Business Restructuring, 15 TAX
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REPORT No. 8, 320, 320–25 (2006).
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and foreign investors.201 It should also focus on threshold issues facing
foreign investors—removing obstacles that would otherwise prevent
foreign investment—instead of offering windfalls. Interestingly, these
simple guidelines are in fact quite useful in resolving some vexing issues
confronting Chinese tax authorities and taxpayers today, for example, how
to interpret “establishment” in the context of investments in Chinese
partnerships and partnership-like entities. I now turn to that question as an
illustration of how the principle of equal treatment of foreign- and
domestically-owned investments must be applied in actual rule design.
B.

Interpretation of “Establishment” for Investment in Partnerships

1.

Symmetry Between Foreign- and Domestically-Invested
Partnerships

Many countries and subnational jurisdictions have had to consider
the following question: Does holding a general or limited partnership
interest in a partnership conducting business in jurisdiction X cause a
foreign partner to have a business nexus to X, such that the foreign partner
is subject to net-income taxation of by X on the partner’s share of income
derived from the activities of the partnership in X?
Generally, being a foreign shareholder of a corporation formed in X
does not create a business nexus with X for the shareholder; nor would
being a creditor of the corporation, unless perhaps the credit were extended
to a borrower in the business of lending.202 More modern limited
partnership laws provide that limited partners have little or no control over
the conduct of a partnership’s business, such that limited partners have no
more control than shareholders have over corporations they own, or
creditors have over their debtors.203 It is typical, for instance, that
management of the partnership is wholly delegated to one or more general
partners.204 It seems logical, then, that a limited partner interest should no

201. It may be worth noting that the recommendation of neutrality here is made in order
to prevent manipulation, and not on the basis of a general attempt to equalize the tax
competitiveness of foreign and domestic investors. The competitive advantage foreign
investors enjoy relative to domestic investors depends on not only source country but also
resident country taxation. See generally Michael Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the
United States?, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (2009).
202. See OECD Model Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(7).
203. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP §§ 12–18, 32 (Aspen Publishers 27th ed. 2009).
204. Id.
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more result in a business nexus than a shareholder’s or creditor’s interest.205
Many jurisdictions, however, have disregarded this logic about
limited partners. For instance, Section 875 of the U.S. tax code provides
that “a nonresident alien individual or foreign corporation shall be
considered as being engaged in a trade or business within the United States
if the partnership of which such individual or corporation is a member is so
engaged.”206 This rule is understood to apply to both general and limited
partners.207 When the predecessor of Section 875 was enacted in 1936,208
the use of limited partnerships (particularly by foreigners) was not as
prevalent as it would become subsequently, and case law from which the
Section was extracted largely concerned general partnerships.209 In the
context of general partnerships, the attribution of partnership activities to its
partners followed from the view of the partnership as a mere aggregate of
its partners and not a separate entity.210 However, under limited partnership
statutes of the various U.S. states, attributing assets and activities of a
partnership to the partners would be incorrect for non-tax purposes.211
From this perspective, the application of Section 875 to limited partnerships
seems inappropriate.212
One suggestion for a defense of Section 875 may be that the
205. Some U.S. states take this view and exempt limited partners of partnerships
operating in the states from return-filing obligations. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-4806(a), 67-4-903(a); see also Tenn. Dep’t of Rev. Ltr. Rul. 97-49 (Dec. 2, 1997), available
at http://www.tn.gov/revenue/rulings/fae/97-49fe.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
206. I.R.C. § 875 (2009).
207. See, e.g., Vitale v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 386 (1979) (holding that a nonresident alien
individual who is a limited partner in a U.S. partnership engaged in trade or business is
deemed to engage in a U.S. trade or business). By contrast, the presence of limited partners
demanded significant adjustment of U.S. domestic partnership tax rules, e.g., on rules that
determine whether allocations of losses or liabilities to a limited partner have “substantial
economic effect”. See also the “alternate test for economic effect” in Treas. Reg. § 1.7041(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 2008).
208. The 1936 provision addressed only non-resident alien individuals and not foreign
corporations.
209. See, e.g., Cantrell & Cochrane, Ltd., 19 B.T.A. 16, 22–25 (1930) (holding that
where an Irish corporation and a U.S. corporation formed a joint venture manufacturing
beverages in the U.S., the Irish corporation was engaged in U.S. trade or business because
the joint venture was so engaged); see also W.C. Johnston v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 920 (1955).
210. W.C. Johnston, 24 T.C. at 922–23.
211. See Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F.Supp. 742 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Evans v. Galardi,
546 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1976); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 203, at §§1.03, 11.03 and
14.02.
212. The issue of whether a limited partnership interest creates a business nexus has
been contested in another area of U.S. inbound taxation: the determination of whether such
an interest constitutes a permanent “establishment” under income tax treaties. See Donroy,
Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962); Robert Unger, T.C. Memo 1990-15,
aff’d, Unger v. Comm’r, 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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structure of tax rules should not be made to depend on the vagaries of
partnership law over time and across jurisdictions: what a limited partner
does and is entitled to do could vary greatly under different partnership
laws and specific partnership agreements. But a stronger defense is in fact
available. The justification for the broad partnership-to-partner attribution
rule of Section 875 probably does not lie in any particular interpretation of
partnership law. Instead, it could be seen as necessary to maintain one set
of partnership rules for both foreign-invested and domestically-owned
partnerships, and, by the same token, equal treatment of domestic and
foreign partners. This may be illustrated by reference to U.S. tax law, but
the basic point is generally applicable.
Suppose, for instance, that a U.S. partnership is engaged in a trade
or business, but that foreign limited partners in the partnership are, contrary
to Section 875, not deemed to be so engaged. Assuming that the foreign
partners do not otherwise engage in a U.S. trade or business, none of their
income derived from the partnership would then be treatable as effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business. This would make it very difficult
to implement the flow-through approach that generally characterizes federal
income taxation of partnerships and partners. First and foremost, there
would be no basis for allocating expenses to the foreign partners, since they
would be taxed only on a gross-income basis. Second, it would no longer
make sense to allow the character of many types of income (e.g., operating
income, Section 1231 gain) to pass through to the partners. However, if the
character of any item of income received by a foreign partner were
indeterminate, its source and applicable tax rate would also become
indeterminate. In other words, treating income of a partnership as received
in the course of a trade or business, while treating the same income, when
allocated or distributed to foreign partners, as not received in the course of a
trade or business, would render flow-through taxation of partnerships
incoherent.213
It is conceivable, of course, to tax foreign partners on partnership
income other than on a flow-through basis. Foreign partners could be
subject to tax only on net income derived from a partnership, and a single
tax rate could be applied to such income depending on whether the foreign
partner is an individual or a corporation. This would be similar to how U.S.
partnerships now compute Section 1446 withholding on effectively
connected income allocated or distributed to foreign partners.214
213. For an overview of the flow-through approach to partnership taxation adopted by
U.S. federal income tax law, see LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE
LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS (West
3d ed. 2006).
214. I.R.C. § 1446 (2009).
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Simplifying even further, a single tax rate may be applied to any net income
allocated or distributed to foreign partners, regardless of whether they are
individuals or corporations. This would basically implement a business
profits tax for foreign partners, its chief difference from a corporate income
tax being that investors are not taxed on distributions from the business’s
after-tax profits.
These ways of taxing foreign partners are not only theoretically
possible, but are in fact practiced in some jurisdictions (including some
U.S. states).215 The crucial point is that they diverge from the flow-through
(or aggregate) approach to partnership taxation that the federal income tax
generally follows. If these non-flow-through approaches are followed,
partners’ individual tax profiles will no longer determine the ultimate tax
liability on income derived from a partnership. This could be unfavorable
to foreign partners in some circumstances and would likely trigger a charge
that the rule violated the non-discrimination article found in most income
tax treaties.216 In other circumstances, computing tax on income derived
from a partnership on a self-standing basis could be favorable to foreign
partners, but this means that the foreign limited partners could receive
better treatment than domestic limited partners who are still subject to flowthrough taxation.
In summary, abandoning the partnership-to-partner attribution rule
of Section 875 for foreign limited partners would be inconsistent with flowthrough taxation of foreign partners, and if flow-through taxation continued
to be practiced at all, there would be a discrepancy in the treatment of
foreign and domestic partners.217 Therefore, in any jurisdiction in which a
215. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
216. See OECD Model Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(3) (“The taxation on a
permanent ‘establishment’ which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other
Contracting State shall not be less favorably levied in that other State than the taxation
levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the same activities.”).
217. I am not aware of such a defense of I.R.C. § 875 having been offered elsewhere,
although in one important case, the U.S. Tax Court made an argument that could be
interpreted along these lines. In Unger, supra note 212, the Tax Court defended the Donroy
doctrine of attributing the permanent “establishment” of a partnership to a foreign limited
partner, even while acknowledging that such an attribution would not be justifiable on the
basis of partnership law alone. In particular, the court stated:
[T]he tax on a partnership’s income and gains is applied at the individual partner level
through the use of the aggregate theory . . . [The] characterization of a partnership as being
merely an association of individuals, for purposes of determining the actual tax to be
imposed on a partnership’s . . . profits, is perhaps the most important characteristic of a
partnership for Federal income tax purposes . . . Because the actual taxation of a partnership
is achieved through the aggregate theory of partnership, we hold the aggregate theory of
partnership to also be applicable when determining whether a partner has a “permanent
establishment” in the United States . . . regardless of whether the partner is a limited or
general partner.
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flow-through, aggregate approach to partnership taxation is taken, if
inbound transactions are also taxed in such a way that business nexus,
however labeled, leads to net-income basis taxation, then partnership-topartner attribution of business activities of the kind Code Section 875
exemplifies should also be observed.
2.

Implication for Partnership Funds in China

China’s previous partnership tax rules cannot easily be categorized
as taking the flow-through approach.218 Nonetheless, tax rules that would
apply to partnerships formed under the newly revised Partnership
Enterprise Law are still being designed, and there is very strong interest on
the part of both domestic and foreign investors in seeing that flow-through
taxation is adopted so that the character of investment income received by a
partnership is preserved when distributed to partners.219 However, if
foreign investors are granted flow-through taxation, they would, by the
logic of the preceding discussion, have to confront the partnership-topartner attribution of establishments (or permanent establishments, if a
treaty is applicable). As we have seen in Section II.B, the issue of
attribution of an “establishment” from an investment fund to the fund’s
investors also arises in connection with a partnership-like form, the nonlegal person CJV.
A recap of the policy considerations in this Section shows clearly
the predicament facing foreign investors in Chinese funds. Such investors
will be found to have an “establishment” in China if they engage in
“production or trade” through a fixed place of business or through agents.
Chinese tax law has not excluded acts of purchasing, holding and selling
securities and other assets from the definition of “production or trade,” let
alone acts of trading securities and managing underlying companies. And it
is unlikely that such a narrowing of the definitions of “production or trade”
would be offered in the near future as a general inducement for the inflow
of foreign investments. Insofar as the activities of an investment
partnership might constitute “production or trade,” such a characterization
would also likely be applied to its general and limited partners, resulting in
Robert Unger, T.C. Memo 1990-15, at 90-58.
218. For example, expenses and losses are not allocated to partners but, rather, offset
partnership income directly and, if unused, are carried forward; similarly, the character of
partnership income does not generally flow through to partners. See Prospect of 'ew
Partnership Taxation, supra note 88, at 627–29, 630.
219. Id. For domestic individual partners, investment income such as dividends, interest
and capital gain is taxed at a lower rate than other types of income from partnerships.
Domestic corporate partners may also benefit from flow-through treatment because of the
inter-corporate dividend exemption, and for other reasons as well.
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net-income basis taxation of income derived from the partnership—
generally an unacceptable consequence for foreign passive investors.220
This analysis also makes clear what a concession to foreign
investors in onshore partnership funds might be. What is at stake is a
threshold issue: if an interest in a Chinese fund is considered an
“establishment” that would subject the owner to net taxation in China, most
foreign investors would not acquire such interests. If the government wants
to encourage foreign acquisition of partnership interests in Chinese funds,
the interpretation of “establishment” will have to be selectively relaxed.
One approach is to designate some fund activities (e.g., performing due
diligence on, negotiating for the purchase of, purchasing, holding and
selling securities) as falling outside the scope of “production or trade.” In
addition, for other activities (e.g., providing consulting and other services to
portfolio companies) that could not be easily excluded from the scope of
“production or trade,” if such activities are performed by other parties (e.g.,
a separate investment manager) neither at the direction of nor for the benefit
of the partnership, then the government could also agree that they do not
lead foreign partners in a fund to have establishments in China. This would
be a continuation of the approach taken in the 2003 VC Tax Rules, as
discussed in Section II.B above.221 Such targeted relaxations would be
more easy to adopt than a more liberal general interpretation of
“establishment.” Finally, to the extent that similar rules are adopted for
domestic investors in the funds as well (e.g., flow-through taxation, certain
income treated as passive investment income and not active operating
income), they would also not lead to any meaningful discrepancy between
the treatment of resident and non-resident investors.
While this approach appears both practical and justifiable on a
number of policy grounds, the analysis it is based on is only preliminary
and can no doubt be further refined. What is important to note, however, is
that unless a new discourse emerges in China among taxpayers, tax
practitioners and administrators as well as policymakers concerning tax
policy toward inbound investment and basic legal concepts such as
establishment, there can be no expectation that the government will tackle
220. For a foreign corporate investor (which generally is the relevant case in the Chinese
context; see supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text), the effect of taxation on a net basis
instead of a gross basis is roughly as follows: (1) the applicable tax rate would be 25%
instead of 10%, with this rate difference being offset to some extent by the deductibility of
certain expenses; and (2) where a treaty applies, a gain on sale that might otherwise have
been exempted under the capital gain article in the treaty will become a normal taxable item
under the business profits article.
221. It would also be similar to the practice of bifurcating the general partner and
investment manager entities in U.S. fund practice. See ANDREW W. NEEDHAM & ANITA
BETH ADAMS, Private Equity Funds, B.N.A. TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 735 at A-18 (2005).
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the issues we have discussed in any fashion like what we have done here.
Generally, this is because tax authorities are guided chiefly by the goal of
revenue preservation, and taxpayers by the goal of minimizing tax, and
these conflicting goals cannot be resolved without policy and legal norms
that show what is reasonable. More specifically, the determination that
some activities might constitute production or trade while others do not is
exactly something that the government has largely avoided doing so far in
the evolution of the concept of establishment, as shown in our previous
discussion.222 Taxpayers’ acquiescence in this practice has arguably
resulted in a general view that there are no norms in this area.223 But
clearly, it cannot be the case such determination is required only in the
investment fund area and not in others.
CONCLUSION
This Article has aimed to identify and analyze some of the basic
concepts, principles, and policy considerations that underlie and unify a
number of seemingly disparate and very practical issues in Chinese taxation
today, such as the tax treatment of onshore investment funds, foreign
investment in real estate, and QFIIs. It does so first by highlighting some
fundamental trends that are likely to lead to paradigmatic changes in
Chinese inbound taxation. These trends include a gradual but definite shift
to a more balanced mix of inbound direct and portfolio investment, as well
as a breach in the traditional bias against the deployment of noncorporate
business forms. In addition to identifying the directions in which Chinese
inbound taxation is likely to evolve, we have approached the legal issues
involved by taking seriously the Chinese tax law concept of establishment.
This has meant two things. One is to examine systematically the concept’s
use under existing law. The other is to evaluate this use, and its possible
augmentation, not primarily in light of “international norms” or concepts
playing similar roles in other countries’ tax systems, but in the first place in
light of the tax and regulatory policies China may adopt in its own unique
circumstances.
We have largely stayed away from the treaty concept of permanent
establishment, or that concept’s interpretation by Chinese authorities.
Although a comparison between the domestic law and the treaty concept is
no doubt useful, it is important to recognize, as a fundamental matter, that
the domestic law concept may well follow its own logic. It is not
222. The main exception to this is Guo shui fa [1996] 212 and related local government
circulars. See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
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uncommon for practitioners of international taxation to speak, particularly
in connection with jurisdictions not their own, of “permanent
establishment” even when they are discussing whether, under the domestic
tax law of a host country, particular items of income may be subject to net
basis taxation, and even when it cannot be assumed that a treaty is
applicable. The risk of being subject to net-income taxation and return
filing obligations is sometimes referred to as “PE risk.” While this blurring
of domestic law concepts with the treaty concept may often serve as
convenient shorthand, it may also imply an assumption that there is one
international norm for designing two-tiered tax systems for inbound
investment and that countries merely differ in the details in implementing
this norm. We have not made that assumption here, and our findings have
shown that dispensing with such an assumption facilitates the
comprehension and analysis of the issues domestic taxing authorities face.

